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Douglas: Standing Under the Fair Housing Act

STANDING ON SHAKY GROUND: STANDING UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
by
Dash T. Douglas∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Standing jurisprudence has undergone a substantial evolution in recent decades.1 The
Supreme Court was particularly active during the 1970s in addressing standing issues in housing
discrimination cases.2 In 1982, the Supreme Court revisited standing, 3 but has been deathly
silent ever since.4 This void has left the development of standing jurisprudence to the lower
courts, which has resulted in a schizophrenic body of law.
Although many commentators have expressed their discontent with standing law in
housing discrimination cases,5 few have examined the threshold issue; that is, who has standing

∗

Trial Attorney, United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Fair Housing;
LL.M., 1998, University of Washington; J.D., 1996, University of California, Hastings; B.S., 1991, Rutgers
University. The author would like to thank Linda Cruciani for her support, encouragement, and wonderful
insights.
1

See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224-25 (1988). In the 1930s, the
Supreme Court began to develop the doctrine of standing. See id. at 225. Professor Fletcher states that the
creation of standing law can be attributed to the “growth of the administrative state and an increase in
litigation to articulate and enforce public, primarily constitutional, values.” Id. Before 1970, the Supreme
Court required the plaintiff to demonstrate a “legal right” or “protected interest.” Eric J. Kuhn, Standing:
Stood Up at the Courthouse Door, 63 GEO. W ASH. L. REV. 886, 887 (1995). By the 1970s, the Court replaced
the “legal interest” test with a substantially more lenient inquiry. Id. The Court established a new liberalized
test that required plaintiffs to demonstrate “an injury-in-fact that . . . fell within the zone of interests
protected by the statutory or constitutional provision in question.” Id. This test had the effect of opening
the courthouse doors “to litigants who did not suffer a direct economic harm . . . .” See id. It was not until
the Burger Court that the reins began to be pulled in on the standing doctrine. See id. at 888. The standing
bar has continued to be raised in the current Court. See id.
2

See Robert G. Schwemm, Standing to Sue in Fair Housing Cases, 41 OHIO ST . L.J. 1, 3 (1980).

3

See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).

4

See Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone: Standing Under the Fair Housing Act, 60 M O. L. REV. 547
(1995).
5

See, e.g., Steven M. Kahaner, Standing: Separation of Powers and the Standing Doctrine: The
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to sue under the Fair Housing Act (hereinafter “FHA” or “Act”)?6 This question appears to be
causing some confusion in the fair housing world because the federal circuit courts have
interpreted the standards established by the Supreme Court in vastly different ways. Thus, the
purpose of this Article is not to critique standing law, but rather to analyze the current state of
standing jurisprudence in an attempt to provide some clarity.
Part II of this Article reviews the general principles of standing and its development
under the FHA. Part III explores the two forms of standing successfully employed by testers –
direct injury and neighborhood standing. Additionally, Part III focuses on the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Havens Realty v. Coleman that the “any person” language in § 3604(d) of the
FHA provides standing to testers,7 and discusses how this holding has been interpreted by
circuit courts in terms of its applicability to other provisions of the FHA. Finally, Part IV
examines the requirements for organizations to achieve standing. Part IV also discusses the
division at the circuit court level regarding the injury-in-fact standard pronounced in Havens,
and it outlines the various circuit court positions.

Unwarranted Use of Judicial Restraint, 56 GEO. W ASH. L. REV. 1074, 1075 (1988) (“Much of the
controversy surrounding the issue [of standing] may be traced to the Supreme Court’s inability to articulate
clear standards for the standing inquiry . . . . This approach has left the doctrine in a state of ‘intellectual
confusion’ leading to what many have found to be unprincipled decisionmaking . . . .”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 68-70 (1984) (“In perhaps no other area of constitutional law has
scholarly commentary been so uniformly critical . . . . The Court has so severely manipulated the injury
standard that the foundation of standing law is essentially incomprehensible.”); Paul A. LeBel, Standing
After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternative Framework for Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1013
(stating that the injury in fact requirement of standing “has been shown to be a mutable and poorly defined
standard”); 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, A DMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:35, at 342 (2d ed. 1983)
(describing standing law as “permeated with sophistry”).
6

See, e.g., Rosman, supra note 4; Ronald L. Phillips, Challenging Discrimination in Real Estate
Advertising: Do “Mere” Readers Have Standing?, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 113 (1997) (focusing on the
issue of reader standing in discriminatory housing advertisement cases).
7

See Havens, 455 U.S. at 373-74.
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II. STANDING UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

Standing is a basic jurisdictional question, finding its roots in Article III of the
Constitution.8 Article III requires that all litigated federal matters involve a case or controversy.9
To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must establish standing to sue.10 Generally, a standing
inquiry involves a two-tiered examination: (1) the constitutional limits on federal court
jurisdiction; and (2) the prudential limits11 that the court exercises “to avoid deciding questions
of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated . . . .”12
The Supreme Court has held that Congress intended to confer standing in suits brought
pursuant to §§ 3610 and 3612 of the FHA to the fullest extent permitted by Article III, thereby
eliminating the prudential barriers to standing.13 However, Congress may not abrogate the

8

See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).

9

See id.

10

See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Fair Hous. Council v. Montgomery
Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1998).
11

Prudential limits are judicially self-imposed rules devised “to limit access to the federal courts to those
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.” Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100. Three prudential rules
frequently mentioned are: (1) litigants should not assert the rights of third parties; (2) litigants should not
assert generalized grievances; and (3) the injury claimed should be in the “zone of interests” of the statute
or provision in question. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982)).
12

Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99-100.

13

See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (finding that Congress eliminated the
prudential barriers to standing in interpreting § 810(a) (later recodified at § 3610(a)). See also Gladstone, 441
U.S. at 91. In Gladstone, the Supreme Court addressed whether the somewhat differently worded § 812
(later recodified at § 3612) likewise eliminated prudential barriers. See id. at 101. The Court found that it did,
stating that §§ 810 and 812 (later recodified at §§ 3610, 3612) were designed to provide alternative remedies
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Article III minima, which requires that the plaintiff suffer “a distinct and palpable injury to
himself” that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted.14
Although standing jurisprudence has been widely criticized for its lack of clarity, the
requirements to establish standing are clear.15 The constitutional limits on federal court
jurisdiction embodied in the case or controversy provision of Article III require a plaintiff to
demonstrate: (1) an “injury in fact” – an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a)
“concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury has to be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) the likelihood, as opposed to mere
speculation, that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”16

III. TESTER STANDING
A. Direct Injury to Testers
Fair housing organizations often employ the use of testers as a means of uncovering
unlawful housing practices. Testers are essentially investigators who pose as renters to collect
evidence necessary to file a complaint; therefore, they play a major role in ferreting out housing

to the same class of plaintiffs. See id. at 102. See also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 364
(1982) (stating that because “Congress intended standing under § 812 [later recodified at § 3612] of the [Fair
Housing] Act to extend to the full limits of Article III . . . courts accordingly lack authority to create
prudential barriers to standing in suits brought under that section.”).
14

Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). See
also Havens, 455 U.S. at 364 (“[T]he sole requirement for standing to sue under § 812 [§ 3612] is the Article
III minima of injury in fact.”); Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (noting that the injury must be fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief).
15

See Kuhn, supra note 1, at 891.

16

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted).
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discrimination. However, on its face, the standing of testers is questionable.17 They have no
intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment when they encounter the discrimination.18
Consequently, they suffer no apparent harm other than that which they invite.19 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court in Havens held that testers have standing under the FHA. 20
In Havens, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) and two testers (one black
and one white) brought an action under § 3604(d)21 of the FHA against Havens Realty
Corporation, the owner of an apartment complex.22 The black tester was informed by Havens
Realty that there were no vacancies, while the white tester was provided accurate information. 23
The Court held that even though the black tester approached the real estate agent fully
expecting to receive false information and without any intent to rent an apartment, he suffered an
injury in fact and, therefore, had standing to maintain a damages claim under the FHA.24
The Court posited that the “injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of
statut[orily] creat[ed] legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”25 The Court

17

See Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990).

18

See Havens, 455 U.S. at 373.

19

See Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1526; Havens, 455 U.S. at 373.

20

See Havens, 455 U.S. at 363-64 (syllabus).

21

Section 3604(d) states “it shall be unlawful . . . [t]o represent to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or
rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994).
22

See Havens, 455 U.S. at 363 (syllabus).

23

See id.

24

See id. at 374.

25

Id. at 373 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
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determined that such a right was created by § 3604(d), which entitles any person to truthful
information concerning the availability of housing.26 Therefore, the Court concluded that a tester
who has received false information has suffered the precise injury that the statute was intended
to prevent.27
Continuing with its analysis, the Court held that the white tester did not have standing.28
The Court stated that the white tester’s situation was different because he did not receive false
information from Havens Realty; rather, he was correctly informed of the availability of
apartments.29 Thus, the Court concluded that the white tester suffered no injury to his statutory
right to accurate information.30

26

See id. at 373-74. Cf. Biggus v. Southmark Management Corp., No. 83C4024, 1985 WL 1751 (June 13, 1985
N.D. Ill.). In Biggus, the Northern District of Illinois restricted “any person” to those persons who are
directly affected by the discriminatory conduct. See id. at *2. Eight black individuals had inquired about
housing availability and were provided false information in violation of § 3604(d). Id. at *1. The defendant
challenged the standing of the three “witness” plaintiffs who were merely present when the
misrepresentations were made to the other testers. Id.
The Court stated that the fact that these plaintiffs “were not testers at the time they first
approached the real estate agent does not negate their right to truthful information . . . .” Id. at *2. The
Court continued that it was the defendant’s provision of misinformation which is important in a § 3604(d)
action and not the plaintiffs’ intent in seeking the information. Id. However, the Court, in remanding for
further fact finding, held that for the plaintiffs to have standing the misrepresentations must have been
communicated to them directly. See id. See also Montana Fair Hous. Inc. v. American Capital Dev., Inc., 81
F. Supp. 2d. 1057, 1064 (D. Mt. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff who had alleged that the defendant ignored
accessibility standards, but who had never actually attempted to gain access to the building, did not have
standing because he was not directly affected by the discriminatory housing design).
27

Havens, 455 U. S. at 373-74.

28

Id. at 375.

29

See id. at 374-75.

30

See id. at 375. See also Nur v. Blake Dev. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 158, 162 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that white
testers did not allege any facts that amounted to an injury under § 3604 of the Act).
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The Supreme Court’s analysis of the “any person” language in § 3604(d) has caused
much angst in the fair housing world.31 Based on the Court’s reasoning, it is unclear whether the
Court’s holding – that testers have standing under § 3604(d) – is applicable to other provisions
of the Act that do not explicitly provide protection to “any person.” This lack of clarity has
given birth to conflicting decisions in the lower courts.
The Second Circuit has held that any person who is confronted by a discriminatory
advertisement, regardless of whether the person was in the market for housing, has standing
under § 3604(c).32 In Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., the defendant, a leasing
and managing agent for two luxury apartments, placed allegedly discriminatory advertisements in
The New York Times.33 The advertisements utilized models, most of whom were white.34 The
plaintiffs, who read the advertisements but who were not searching for an apartment, argued
that the advertisements indicated a race preference in violation of § 3604(c).35

31

See, e.g., Rosman, supra note 4, at 547. Rosman states that: “Judge Posner and several commentators
have noted that the idea that [the black tester in Havens] suffered a factual injury is difficult to swallow.” Id.
at 576 (citing Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990))s. See also Steven L.
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN . L. REV. 1371, 1483 (1988)
(arguing that neither the white nor the black tester in Havens suffered an injury in fact); Fletcher, supra note
1, at 253; Christopher J. Sprigman, Comment, Standing on Firmer Ground: Separation of Powers and
Deference to Congressional Findings in the Standing Analysis, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1645, 1649-50 (1992).
32

See Ragin, 6 F.3d at 904. See also Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (E.D. Va.
1987) (stating that the statutory rights approach established in Havens is applicable to § 3604(c)).
33

See Ragin, 6 F.3d at 902.

34

See id.

35

See id. at 901-03. Section 3604(c) states that:
[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1994).
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The Court compared the factual situation before it to the testers’ receipt of
misinformation in Havens and found that the plaintiffs had standing.36 The Court stated that
“[t]here is no significant difference between the statutorily recognized injury suffered by the
testers in Havens and the injury suffered” by the plaintiffs in Ragin.37
The Tenth Circuit has taken a far more restrictive approach to standing under
§ 3604(c).38 In Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., the Court explicitly
rejected the analysis in Ragin39 and Saunders and found that the reading of a discriminatory
advertisement by one who is not in the market for housing is insufficient to confer standing.40
The Court found the “any person” analysis of Havens inapplicable because, unlike § 3604(d), §
3604(c) does not provide protection to “any person.”41 To support its position, the Court cited
Spann v. Colonial Village, in which Judge Ginsberg expressed doubt as to whether the mere
receipt of a discriminatory advertisement was sufficient to establish standing.42 The Court

36

See Ragin, 6 F.3d at 904.

37

Id. See also Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990). In Dwivedi, the Seventh Circuit
found that testers have standing to sue under § 3604(a) “even though they [did not make a ‘bona fide offer’
and] sustained no harm beyond the discrimination itself . . . .” Id. at 1527. The court reasoned that the logic
of Havens embraces § 3604(a) of the FHA. See id.
38

See Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590 (10th Cir. 1996).

39

Some commentators have taken issue with the Second Circuit’s analysis in Ragin. See, e.g., Rosman,
supra note 4, at 587 (noting that the Court “obscure[d] the underlying goal of a statutory standing inquiry,
viz., whom did Congress want to enforce the provision in question?”). See also Phillips, supra note 6, at
120-21.
40

See Wilson, 98 F.3d at 595.

41

See id. at 596.

42

See id. at 595. In Spann v. Colonial Village Inc., Judge Ginsberg stated: “we question whether Congress
intended 804(c) [42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)] to confer a legal right on all individuals to be free from indignation and
distress.” Spann v. Colonial Village Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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averred that holding otherwise would confer standing on anyone who receives a discriminatory
housing advertisement.43 The Court concluded that the courts in Ragin and Saunders “take
Havens too far.”44
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit limits the “any person” discussion in Havens to provisions of
the Act where that language is explicitly stated.45 In Ricks v. Beta Development Co., the
plaintiff challenged the district court’s dismissal of his § 3604(f) action for lack of standing.46
The Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s dismissal, stating that “unlike section 3604(d),
which uses the language ‘any person’, . . . section 3604(f)(1) employs the terms ‘renter or
buyer’ suggesting that . . . Ricks must allege that he is a prospective buyer to achieve
standing.”47 Therefore, the Court elaborated that Ricks was required to make some allegation
of interest in the condominium.48
Did the Supreme Court in Havens hold that Congress created statutory rights for any
person in all provisions of the Act enforced by § 3612? Practitioners and litigants have been
left with an array of contrary circuit court decisions. Although they are at odds, the Second,

43

See Wilson, 98 F.3d at 595.

44

Id.

45

See Ricks v. Beta Dev. Co., No. 95-15334, 1996 WL 436548, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 1, 1996).

46

See id. The plaintiff, Jeff Ricks, was a paraplegic who alleged that the defendant’s condominium
contained architectural barriers for people with disabilities. Id.
47

Id. See also United States v. Rock Springs Vista Dev. Corp., No. CV-S-97-1825JBR(RLH), 1999 WL
1491621, at *3 (D. Nev. July 2, 1999) (holding that because § 3604(f)(1) contains the phrase “buyer or renter”
and not “any person,” the plaintiff must demonstrate some interest in the property to satisfy the injury-infact requirement). The case was appealed and the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on February 14, 2001.
48

See Ricks, 1996 WL 436548, at *1.
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Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have made their stance clear as to their interpretation of the
“any person” analysis in Havens. This is helpful to litigants in those jurisdictions, but what about
potential litigants in the remaining jurisdictions? This raises important questions, not the least of
which is whether fair housing organizations that test for various illegal actions – such as
discriminatory refusal to rent or sell under § 3604(a) and § 3604(f) or discriminatory advertising
under § 3604(c) – have standing to bring an action based on their findings. A better question
may be whether fair housing organizations should even bother to use precious resources to test
for discrimination under these sections in such an uncertain legal environment.

B. Indirect Injury to Testers
A second strategy to achieve standing is referred to as “neighborhood” or “third party”
standing.49 This standing concept is most often employed by white testers in racial steering
cases.50 Neighborhood standing differs from “tester” standing because the injury asserted is
indirect; that is, the injury adversely impacts the neighborhood in which the plaintiff resides as a
result of racial steering.51 As the argument goes, the illegal racial steering deprives the
inhabitants of the neighborhood of the benefits derived from interracial associations.52
In Havens, the Court, after determining that the white tester did not have standing by
virtue of the misinformation provided to the black tester, examined whether the white tester had

49

See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 375 (1982).

50

See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93-95 (1979); Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 206-08 (1972); Havens, 455 U.S. at 374-75.
51

See Havens, 455 U.S. at 374-75.

52

See, e.g., Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 111-12; Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10.
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standing regardless of his status as a tester. 53 The Court began its analysis with Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood.54 In Gladstone, six testers attempted to determine whether
certain real estate companies were engaging in racial steering.55 Four of the plaintiffs were
homeowners in the community to which the defendants allegedly steered African-Americans.56
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ discriminatory steering practices denied them the right
to live in an interracial society.57 Specifically, they alleged that they were deprived of the
“important social, professional, business and economic, political and aesthetic benefits of an
integrated community . . . .”58
The Court, construing the plaintiffs’ claim as referring to a 12-by-13 block area, found
that the four testers who owned homes in the targeted area had standing. 59 The Court rejected
the defendants’ contention that there is a distinction between the apartment complex found in
Trafficante,60 – a sufficiently confined area that the fact finder could infer a personal injury –

53

See Havens, 455 U.S. at 374-75.

54

See id. at 376.

55

See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 94. It should be noted that the testers did not attempt to press the claim that
they had standing in their capacity as testers. See id.
56

See id. at 93-95.

57

See id. at 111.

58

Havens, 455 U.S. at 363.

59

See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 95, 114.

60

Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In Trafficante, two tenants of an apartment
complex (one black and one white) alleged that their landlord discriminated against non-whites. Id. at 20607. They claimed, and the Court agreed, that they suffered an injury in fact by being deprived of the social
and professional benefits of living in an integrated community. See id. at 208-10.

11
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and a 12-by-13 block residential neighborhood.61 The Court disagreed, stating that there is no
categorical distinction between an injury suffered by occupants of a large apartment complex
and that exacted upon residents of a relatively compact neighborhood.62 The Court continued:
“[t]he constitutional limits of standing to protest the intentional segregation of their community do
not vary simply because that community is defined in terms of city blocks rather than apartment
buildings. Rather, they are determined by the presence or absence of a distinct and palpable
injury.”63
The Court’s decision effectively broadened the geographic scope of neighborhood
standing from an apartment complex to a 12-by-13 block neighborhood. The Court in
Havens, however, was reluctant to extend its holding in Gladstone to an area consisting of 37
square miles and a population of 220,000 people.64 The Court stated that it was implausible
that the defendants’ acts of discrimination could have palpable effects throughout such a vast
area.65 The Court added that it has upheld standing based on discriminatory effects, but only

61

See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 113.

62

Id. at 114.

63

Id.

64

See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 377 (1982). The defendants in Havens did not dispute
that the loss of social, professional, and economic benefits resulting from steering practices constituted a
palpable injury. See id. Instead, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how the
steering practices affected their particular neighborhood. See id.
65

See Havens, 455 U.S. at 377. See also South Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Santefort Real Estate, Inc., 658 F.
Supp. 1450, 1452, 1454, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that eight plaintiffs, who were not seeking to purchase a
home but lived in the targeted area, which spanned 220 miles and had a population of 700,000, lacked
standing). Cf. Sherman Park Community Assoc. v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 486 F. Supp. 838, 842 (E.D. Wis.
1980) (holding neighborhood standing extended to an area consisting of approximately twenty-five by
twelve blocks). See also Nur v. Blake Dev. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ind. 1987). In Nur, plaintiffs
requested the court to expand neighborhood standing not on a geographic basis, but on the basis of the
type of injury suffered. Id. at 163. The plaintiffs (white testers) argued for the court to extend neighborhood
standing to include injuries suffered – emotional distress, embarrassment, humiliation – as a result of
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within a “relatively compact neighborhood.”66 Nevertheless, the Court did not find, as a matter
of law, that an injury could not be proven.67 This leaves open the question of how broad an
area must be to constitute a “relatively compact neighborhood.”68

C. Summary of Tester Standing
Testers have argued two separate theories of standing: one involving a direct injury and
the other involving an indirect injury suffered resulting from conduct adversely impacting their
neighborhood.69 With regard to the former, even though they fully expect to receive false
information and have no intention of renting or purchasing a home, testers have standing for
violations of § 3604(d) of the FHA. 70 The Supreme Court in Havens found that Congress
created a statutory right to truthful information for “any person” regarding the availability of

“members of their own race engaging in prohibited discriminatory conduct.” Id. The Court declined to do
so, stating that “stigmatic, non-economic injuries . . . accord a basis for standing only to ‘those persons who
are personally denied equal treatment’ by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Id. (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)). To accept the plaintiffs’ argument, the Court posited, would require
conferring standing on all white persons, regardless of where they reside. Id. This “would transform the
federal courts into ‘no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned
bystanders.’ ” Id. at 164 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
66

Havens, 455 U.S. at 377 (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 114).

67

The Court ordered further pleading, providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to establish that the
defendants’ discrimination had a palpable effect on the area in question. Id.
68

Id.

69

See, e.g., Village of Bellwood v. Gorey & Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ill. 1987). In Gorey, the
defendants confused the two forms of tester standing. See id. at 325. The defendants argued that the
testers, who were provided misinformation, did not have standing because they did not live in the targeted
area. Id. The Court, finding that the testers were victimized by a discriminatory misrepresentation, and
therefore suffered a direct injury, explained that the fact that these plaintiffs resided outside of the targeted
area was irrelevant to proving such an injury. Id. at 325-26.
70

See Havens, 455 U.S. at 363.
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housing under § 3604(d).71 Therefore, the violation of this right, in and of itself, confers standing
upon the tester.72 This decision has resulted in inconsistent rulings at the circuit court level
regarding whether testers have standing when other provisions of the FHA are violated.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING
An organization can achieve standing either on its own behalf (first-party standing) or as
a representative of its members who have suffered an injury.73 Although it is fraught with
confused and contrary circuit court decisions, the former ground is most commonly employed
by fair housing organizations. For this reason, and because this area of standing jurisprudence is
particularly problematic, this section will focus on the issues surrounding first-party standing.

A. First-party Standing
In Havens, the Supreme Court set out the standard for first-party standing.74 The
Court determined that first-party standing for organizations involves the same inquiry as for

71

See id. at 373-74.

72

See id.

73

The Supreme Court has recognized that an organization may achieve standing based on the
representation of its members. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977). In order to establish standing on this basis, the organization must show: (1) the conduct challenged
is injurious to its members – “its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right”; (2) “the
interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose”; and (3) the nature of the claim or the
relief sought does not necessitate the participation of an injured member for proper resolution of the suit.
Id.; see also HOPE, Inc. v. DuPage County, Ill. 738 F.2d 797, 813 (7th Cir. 1984); Association for Retarded
Citizens v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir.
1994).
74

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
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individual standing;75 that is, the plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact, causation,76 and
redressability.77
In Havens, HOME and two of its employed testers brought an action against Havens
Realty as the owner of an apartment complex. 78 The plaintiffs alleged that Havens Realty

75

See id. at 378.

76

The causation prong of the Article III test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a causal connection
between the injury and the defendant’s actions. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992); Arkansas ACORN Fair Hous., Inc. v. Greystone Dev., Ltd., 160 F.3d 433, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1998)
(requiring organization to present facts which quantify the resources it used to counteract, monitor or
investigate defendant’s actions); Fair Hous. Council v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 76-78 (3d Cir.
1998) (“[S]pecific facts that [the organization] was ‘directly’ affected” by the alleged discrimination is
required to establish standing); HOPE, 738 F.2d at 815 (holding that organization that failed to show that
even a single developer was deterred by the defendant’s actions from proposing low and moderate income
housing did not have standing).
77

See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 472 (1982). The third element of Article III standing asks whether a favorable decision will redress the
alleged injury. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. The Supreme Court has been less than consistent in its approach
to this requirement. See Kuhn, supra note 1, at 893. Kuhn opines that: “the Supreme Court has wavered as
to the precise degree of specificity needed to fulfill the redressability requirement.” Id. In some instances,
the Court has required that the injury “likely” be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. (citing Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977)). In other cases, the Court has
required a plaintiff to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood” that the injury would be removed by a favorable
decision. Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Entvl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978)). In still
other cases, the Court has applied a strict standard, requiring that the injury be “in fact” redressable by the
Court. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976).
The Court’s ostensibly mercurial approach to “redressability” has prompted one commentator to
state: “[t]he redressability requirement, so easily described in judicial opinions, has been applied with such a
determined inconsistency that it can likely be explained only by the Court’s view of the merits of the cases.”
Nichol, supra note 5, at 72 (citing Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 75 n.20; Village of Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 262; Simon, 426 U.S. at 45). Even so, the “Court has consistently refused to speculate on whether a
plaintiff’s injury would be cured through a favorable decision,” making this requirement a non-issue. See
Kuhn, supra note 1, at 893 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 44 (noting “unadorned speculation will not suffice to
invoke the federal judicial power”)); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973)(“[D]enying standing
because the prospect that favorable judicial relief would solve plaintiff’s injury was ‘only speculative.’ ”).
78

See Havens, 455 U.S. at 363 (syllabus).
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practiced racial steering in violation of § 3604(d) of the FHA. 79 The Court addressed the issue
of whether HOME alleged an injury sufficient to confer standing upon the organization.80
The Court found that there was no question that HOME suffered the requisite injury.81
HOME devoted significant resources to identifying and counteracting Havens Realty’s
discriminatory steering practices, which frustrated the organization’s counseling and referral
services.82 The Court concluded that “[s]uch a concrete and demonstrable injury to the
organization’s activities – with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources – constitutes
far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests . . . .”83
The injury in fact standard expressed in Havens is not exactly a model of clarity, as the
various interpretations of the case demonstrate.84 The only thing that is clear about the decision
is the division that has resulted among the circuit courts.85 The language regarding the drain on
an organization’s resources has been particularly conflicting. Three circuit courts have
interpreted this clause broadly, while an equal number have construed it with a more restrictive
eye.86

79

See id.

80

See id. at 376.

81

See id. at 379.

82

See id.

83

Id. at 379 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).

84

See Rosman, supra note 4, at 591-92 (discussing four possible interpretations of Havens).

85

See Fair Hous. Council v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 79 n.6 (pointing out the different views
of Havens adopted by sister courts). See also Rosman, supra note 4, at 593-94.
86

Although the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have not rendered an opinion on this matter, the district courts in
these circuits have. While the district courts in the Ninth Circuit have followed the strict interpretation
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1. Liberal Interpretations of Havens
The Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have found that, for an organization to
demonstrate an injury in fact, it need only show a deflection of resources from its daily
activities to the pursuit of legal efforts against the discrimination.87 “Legal efforts” has
been held to include such activities as investigating the alleged discrimination and the filing of the
lawsuit.88
The Seventh Circuit, in Dwivedi, stated that “Havens makes clear . . . that the only
injury which need be shown to confer standing on a fair-housing agency is deflection of the
agency’s time and money from counseling to legal efforts directed against discrimination.”89
Using this as its guide, the Court found that using testers to investigate discriminatory practices
was an injury sufficient to confer standing.90 Three years later, the Second Circuit followed
suit.91
In Ragin, the Open Housing Center (OHC) devoted substantial blocks of time to

approach, the district courts in the Fourth Circuit have reached mixed conclusions. No courts in the First,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have directly addressed what constitutes a sufficient deflection of an
organization’s resources.
87

See, e.g., Ragin v. MacKlowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993); Hooker v. Weathers, 990 F.2d 913
(6th Cir. 1993); Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990).
88

See Ragin, 6 F.3d at 905; Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1526; Hooker, 990 F.2d at 915.

89

Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1526. The Sixth Circuit has reached the same conclusion. See Hooker, 990 F.2d at
915 (holding that fair housing organization which devoted resources to investigating the defendants’
practices had standing).
90

See Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1525-26.

91

See Ragin, 6 F.3d 898.
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investigating and attempting to remedy the defendants’ discriminatory advertisements.92 OHC
also took steps to file an administrative complaint that required it to identify the building
developers, the marketing agent, and the advertising agent.93 The Court, utilizing a similarly
broad definition of resource diversion employed in Dwivedi, found OHC’s expenditure of
resources sufficient to confer standing on the fair housing organization. 94

2. Strict Interpretations of Havens
The District of Columbia, Third, and Fifth Circuits reject this broad interpretation of
Havens, 95 and hold that, in order for an organization to demonstrate the requisite injury, it must
show an expenditure of resources on organizational activities independent of the lawsuit.96
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington v.
BMC Marketing Corp., stated that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Dwivedi would effectively

92

See id. at 905.

93

See id.

94

See id. (citing Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1526).

95

See, e.g., Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Spann v. Colonial
Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Dallas County Mental Health
& Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1994); Fair Hous. Council v. Montgomery
Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 79 (3d Cir. 1998) (adopting the position of the D.C. Circuit in BMC and Spann).
96

See, e.g., Spann, 899 F.2d at 27; Association for Retarded Citizens, 19 F.3d at 244; Fair Hous. Council,
141 F.3d at 79. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet decided this issue. However, there are
district courts in the Ninth Circuit that have rendered decisions on this issue. See United States v. Rock
Springs Vista Dev. Corp., No. CV-S-97-1825JBR(RLH), 1999 WL 1491621, at *4 (D. Nev. July 2, 1999) (holding
that an organization only suffers the requisite injury in fact if it alleges that the discriminatory conduct
required it to increase the resources it devotes to non-litigious and non-enforcement activities); Project
Sentinel v. Evergreen Ridge Apartments, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that the costs
incurred in identifying and litigating instances of unlawful conduct alone does not constitute injury in fact).
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eliminate the injury in fact requirement altogether.97 The Court explained that this overly broad
reading of Havens would permit an organization to manufacture the injury necessary to maintain
a suit by spending time and money on that very suit.98 In essence, the litigant could create the
requisite injury by bringing a case, thus making Article III not a real limitation.99 The Court
explained that the diversion of resources to testing is a self-inflicted harm resulting not from any
actions taken by the defendant, but rather from the organization’s own budgetary choices.100
The Court concluded that Havens does not “support such a purely self-referential injury.”101
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit has held that an organization cannot have standing merely
because it redirected some of its resources to litigation in response to actions of the
defendant.102 In Association for Retarded Citizens of Dallas v. Dallas County Mental
Health & Mental Retardation Center Board of Trustees, Advocacy, Inc., the plaintiff
contended that it suffered an injury in fact because it expended resources to challenge the
wrongful actions of the defendants.103 The Court found this argument untenable and explained

97

See BMC, 28 F.3d at 1277.

98

See id. See also Spann, 899 F.2d at 27 (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 799 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
99

See Spann, 899 F.2d at 27 (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr., 809 F.2d at 799 n.2).

100

See BMC, 28 F.3d at 1276.

101

Id. at 1277.

102

See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of
Trustees, 19 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1994).
103

See id. Advocacy, Inc. also argued that it had standing by virtue of being a federally funded program
established to protect and advocate the rights of disabled individuals. See id. The Court stated that being a
federally funded program designed to provide disabled persons with legal representation does not enhance
the assertion of organizational standing. See id.
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that this position would permit “any sincere plaintiff [to] bootstrap standing by expending its
resources in response to the actions of another.”104
3. Middle Ground Interpretations of Havens
The district courts in the Fourth Circuit have provided a novel interpretation of
Havens.105 It appears that the District of Maryland in Williams v. Poretsky Management,
Inc., took a middle ground approach. 106 In Williams, the Fair Housing Council of Greater
Washington (FHC) brought an action against apartment owners for discrimination on the basis
of sex.107 FHC alleged that it devoted significant resources to counseling the victim of sexual
harassment and investigating her complaint.108 The Court determined that this deflection of
resources was a perceptible impairment to the organization’s efforts against discrimination, and
thus satisfied the injury in fact requirement.109
The Court, following an opinion of the Eastern District of Virginia, stated that Saunders
v. General Services Corp. “refined” the standard for what constitutes a deflection of resources,

104

Id. It should be noted that in a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit indicated that an organization may
satisfy the injury in fact requirement if it stopped everything and devoted all of its attention to the litigation
and diverted resources to counteracting the defendant’s actions. See Louisiana ACORN Fair Hous. v.
LeBlanc, 211 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 427 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000)). This
focus on the diversion of all of an organization’s activities to litigation adds another twist to this issue in
the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit, to that point, had only described what would not suffice to confer
standing; that is, the diversion of some of the organization’s resources to litigious activities. See
Association for Retarded Citizens, 19 F.3d at 244.
105

See Williams v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490 (D. Md. 1996); Saunders v. General Servs.
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1052 (E.D. Va. 1987).
106

See Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 493.

107

See id. at 491.

108

See id. at 493.

109

See id.
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as set forth in Spann. 110 In Saunders, the Court stated that standing should not be negated
merely because some resources are spent on activities necessary to the suit.111 The Court
concluded that the testers’ activities, while providing evidence to form the basis of the
action, are still relevant in a standing analysis.112 Thus, breaking from both the liberal and
strict approaches, these courts hold that while resources expended on legal efforts do not, in
and of themselves, result in the requisite injury, they should, be considered in the standing
analysis.

B. Agency Non-acquiescence
Inconsistency at the circuit court level presents a problem for agencies such as HUD,
which administers a national program. Agencies favor administrative uniformity to promote

110

Id. at 493-94 (citing Saunders, 659 F. Supp. at 1052). In Spann, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that
to acquire standing, an organization must allege a devotion of resources to activities other than those
challenging the lawsuit. Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)).
111

Saunders, 659 F. Supp. at 1052.

112

See id. (citing Havens, 455 U.S. 363). In a more recent decision of the District of Maryland, the Court
appears to interpret Havens somewhat differently. See Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. v. Continental
Landmark, Inc., Fair Housing - Fair Lending (P-H) ¶ 16,236, 16236.2 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 1997). In Continental
Landmark, Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc. (BNI) claimed that it invested time and resources investigating a
complaint and preparing materials for use in a suit against the defendants. See id. The Court, finding that
BNI could not acquire standing by merely alleging that it expended resources on litigation, explained that
the utilization of resources and funds to investigate and gather information was not a “concrete and
demonstrable injury.” Id. at ¶ 16,236.2-16,236.3. The Court found, however, that the expenditure of
resources dedicated to “detecting whether discrimination . . . [was] occurring . . . and educating the
public” was sufficient to confer standing. Id. (emphasis added). The Court did not specify which BNI
activities it determined to be dedicated to detecting whether discrimination was occurring. This language
could be read to include the utilization of testers, although the court stated that the use of resources to
investigate was itself insufficient to confer standing. See id. Cf. Pumphrey v. Stephen Homes, Inc., No. Civ.
A. HAR 93-1329, 1994 WL 150947, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 1994) (concluding that sending out testers alone
was a sufficient deflection of resources to establish standing). This court that decided this case also
decided Continental Landmark .
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horizontal equity in their treatment of similarly situated persons and organizations.113 Applying
their regulations uniformly simplifies the administration of the agencies’ programs, which makes
the operation more efficient and less expensive.114 This raises the question of whether an
agency can ignore the precedent established in a particular jurisdiction – or “non-acquiesce” – in
an effort to administer a uniform national program.115 Although this issue is not neatly tied to the
purpose of this Article, its implications for organizational standing are sufficient to warrant some
attention.
Whether federal agencies are currently bound by the decisions of the circuit courts of
appeals is a hotly debated question. 116 Understandably, federal courts and the Association of

113

See Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1815, 1819 (1989).
114

See id. See also Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need
for Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 29 SOC. SEC. REP . SERVICE 627, 658 (1990).
115

Government agencies offer many justifications for non-acquiescing, but the one most strongly and
widely argued is that non-acquiescence is necessary for an agency to administer its statutory
responsibilities in a uniform manner on a nationwide basis. See Kubitschek, supra note 114, at 655;
Schwartz, supra note 113, at 1818-19. However, the uniformity justification offered by agencies has been
met with skepticism. See, e.g., Johnson v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 969 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In
Johnson, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Railroad Board’s argument that its non-acquiescence
policy was in the interest of the uniformity of its programs. See id. at 1092. The Court, questioning the
Railroad Board’s sincerity, stated that although the agency claimed that the circuit court misinterpreted the
law, it failed to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. See id. Therefore, it appears, the Court averred,
that the Railroad Board is “less interested in national uniformity than in denying benefits one way or
another.” Id. See also Kubitschek, supra note 114, at 631 (rejecting the uniformity justification, stating that
adverse decisions are rarely brought before the Supreme Court to avoid setting unfavorable precedent
which the agency would be obliged to follow nationally).
116

See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 113. In his article, Professor Schwartz argues that Article III forbids an
agency from maintaining a practice of nonacquiescence. See id. at 1860. Professor Schwartz notes that his
view differs from that of Professors Estreicher and Revesz. See id. at 1861 (citing Samuel Estreicher &
Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989)). While
Professors Estreicher and Revesz espouse a balancing test where the agency’s policy justifications are
weighed against the costs imposed on the private litigants, Professor Schwartz would simply limit nonacquiescence to “situations in which the conduct is consistent with the maintenance of the judicial power of
the Article III courts.” Schwartz, supra note 113, at 1863. Professor Scwhartz clarifies, however, that he
agrees that, in certain situations, non-acquiescence should be permissible, but argues that it should be the
exception and not the norm. Id. at 1865. See also Kubitschek, supra note 114, at 627-29 (disagreeing with

22
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol34/iss3/1

22

Douglas: Standing Under the Fair Housing Act

Administrative Law Judges strongly oppose agency non-acquiescence.117 Although most
courts118 have routinely criticized this practice and have found it to be unlawful,119 some
agencies have held firm in their stance that they are not bound by circuit court decisions.120
This issue has not gone unnoticed by Congress.121 There is a bill (H.R. 1924), the
Federal Agency Compliance Act, currently in the U.S. House of Representatives that, if passed,

Professors Estreicher and Revesz’s analysis of agency non-acquiescence); Federal Agency Compliance
with Judicial Septem, 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1924 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of William B.
Schultz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General), available at 1999 WL 27596379 (stating that the Department of
Justice has consistently held the position that agency non-acquiescence is constitutional and, therefore,
should be permissible).
117

See Kubitschek, supra note 114, at 631-32; Federal Agency Compliance with Judicial Septem, 1999:
Hearing on H.R. 1924 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Ronald G. Bernoski on behalf of the Association of
Administrative Law Judges), available at 1999 WL 27596382.
118

The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the agency non-acquiescence question. In the only case before
the Court that directly challenged agency non-acquiescence, the Court did not address the issue. See
Heckler v. Lopez, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984).
119

See Rogers v. Chater, 118 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he policy of non-acquiescence is flagrantly
unlawful.”); Hillhouse v. Harris, 715 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (“It is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is . . . and the Secretary [of HHS] will
ignore that principle at his peril.”); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[T]he
judiciary’s duty and authority . . . ‘to say what the law is’ would be rendered a virtual nullity if coordinate
branches of government could effectively and unilaterally strip its pronouncements of any precedential
force . . . .”), vacated sub nom., Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F.
Supp. 26, 30 (D.C. Cal. 1983) (holding that secretary violated the Separation of Powers doctrine in
announcing her non-acquiescence in federal appeals court decisions), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 725 F.2d
1489 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, Heckler v. Lopez, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984). See also NLRB v. Eastern Smelting and
Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979), overruled by NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981);
ITT World Communications Inc. v. FCC, 635 F.2d 32, 43 (2d Cir. 1980); Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376 (4th Cir.
1986); Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1986); Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.
1984); Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984); Childress v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 679 F.2d 623, 630 (6th Cir. 1982); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d
32, 33 (3d Cir. 1980); PPG Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 823 n.9 (4th Cir. 1982); Beverly Enter. v. NLRB,
727 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 1984).
120

The Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and the National Labor Relations Board
have gone as far as adopting policies of non-acquiescence. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325,
1331 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Kubitschek, supra note 114, at 684 n.1 (citing many government agencies
that have practiced various forms of non-acquiescence, including the National Labor Relations Board,
Internal Revenue Service, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, United States Postal Service,
Federal Communications Commission, Railroad Retirement Board, and the Social Security Administration).
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would eliminate agency non-acquiescence.122 The bill requires federal agencies to adhere to
precedents set by the circuit court for the circuit in which the agency is located when it
administers its programs or enforces its regulations.123 Because of its wide base of bi-partisan
support,124 the bill appears to be primed to become law. 125
C. Summary of Organizational Standing
Havens, the leading decision for first party standing, has given birth to various
interpretations of the injury in fact requirement of Article III standing. The Second, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits employ an expansive approach, requiring only a deflection of resources from
an organization’s daily activities to the pursuit of legal efforts directed against the defendant. In
contrast, the District of Columbia, Third, and Fifth Circuits, and the district courts in the Ninth
Circuit require an organization to demonstrate an expenditure of resources independent of the

121

During the 98th Congress, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill (H.R. 3755) that severely
criticized the Social Security Administration’s non-acquiescence policy. Kubitschek, supra note 114, at 677.
The Senate, however, passed a different bill, which permitted non-acquiescence. See id. at 678. As a result
of this clear Congressional divide, the matter was referred to the Conference Committee. See id. The
Committee was unable to reconcile the bills however, and Congress subsequently enacted the Social
Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, which was bereft of a non-acquiescence provision. See id.
(citing Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)). The
Committee did, however, condemn the practice of non-acquiescence, stating that the result of agency nonacquiescence is “undesirable.” See id. at 678 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP . NO. 98-1039, at 38, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3080).
122

Similar legislation (H.R. 1544) was adopted by the House during the 105th Congress, but the Senate Bill
(S. 1166) was pending on the Senate floor when the session of Congress ended. The current bill includes
some changes recommended by the Senate during the last Congress.
123

See Michael Posner, House Panel Tells Agencies to Obey Courts, NAT ’L J. NEWS SERVICE , (June 21,
2000) <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0600/062100t3.htm>.
124

See Federal Agency Compliance with Judicial Septem, 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1924 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Ronald G. Bernoski on behalf of the Association of Administrative Law Judges),
available at 1999 WL 27596382.
125

As of the writing of this Article, the latest action on the bill was on June 21, 2000, when the House
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lawsuit. To further complicate matters, two district courts in the Fourth Circuit have staked a
middle ground, holding that while diversion of resources to litigation-related activities alone is
insufficient to confer standing, it should still be considered in the standing analysis. 126
Clearly the inconsistency among the circuit courts is problematic for fair housing
organizations. Additionally, this inconsistency affects HUD because HUD relies upon these fair
housing organizations to bring housing discrimination actions in furtherance of its mission.
Varying precedents from jurisdiction to jurisdiction make the administration of a national
program arduous. To circumvent similar situations, some agencies have non-acquiesced in
those circuit court decisions they have found to be contrary to their policy. This practice has
stirred up the judicial and legislative hornet’s nests, placing the viability of agency nonacquiescence in doubt.

V. CONCLUSION
Although the various circuits are clearly at odds, the Supreme Court has not seen fit to
unify the direction of standing under the Fair Housing Act. When will the Court again descend

Judiciary approved the bill and cleared it for full committee action. See Posner, supra note 123.
126

The Administrative Law Judges appear to favor the more expansive view of Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). In HUD v. Jancik, the only HUD Administrative Law Judges’ decision
specifically addressing this issue, the Leadership Council (Council) brought an action alleging that the
defendant violated the FHA. HUD v. Jancik, 1993 WL 388608, at *1 (H.U.D. A.L.J.). The Council employed
two testers to investigate whether the defendant was discriminating on the basis of familial status. Id. at *1,
*3. The Council’s investigation manager spent an hour designing a test that involved the construction of
fictitious identities for the testers and selecting the appropriate people to perform the test. Id. at * 3.
The Court, relying on the standard established in the Seventh Circuit, found that the Council had
standing. Id. at *5 (citing City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., 982 F.2d 1086, 1095 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that an organization which, during the course of investigating the defendant’s activities,
had deflected its time and money from counseling to legal efforts directed against discrimination, satisfied
the standard established in Dwivedi)). The Court reasoned that, at a minimum, the Council expended
resources investigating and prosecuting the action. Id. at *5. In so finding, the Court provided no
indication whether its holding was the position of the Administrative Law Judges or whether it was merely
following the law of the circuit in which the case arose. See id.
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from its lofty mount and provide guidance to the swooning fair housing masses? Until that day,
practitioners and litigants will have to continue to weave their way through this veritable standing
maze that is beset with unclear, inelaborate, and oftentimes contrary decisions of the lower
courts. For now, it appears that the Supreme Court is content to allow confusion to reign, and
thus to leave fair housing advocates standing on shaky ground.127

127

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development or of the United States.
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